Will we get bogged down in quicksand?

Sumantra Maitra writes in the Federalist,

Any crisis leads to paranoia, hysteria, and essentially all other basest instincts in a human being. What differentiates a realist or a strategist from an ideologue or a cultist is how one thinks in a nuanced fashion during a crisis situation.

The question is not if something is right, moral, or legal, but of prudence and smartness. Given the state of the debate about the ongoing crisis in Iran, one can’t help but feel even more depressed. Nevertheless, as Iran targeted U.S. bases in Iraq, and as an international security crisis escalates, where British Royal Navy warships are massing in the Strait of Hormuz, there needs to be a debate, and for a debate, there needs to be clarity about a few common misconceptions.

...t was curious that a mere ten missiles dropped dumb pay loads in a U.S. base where the majority of the soldiers were Iraqi. That meant the mission was strictly targeted for a domestic audience and regime stability. Within hours, confirmations started to pour in.

One can logically deduce that there is no appetite for greater conflict in Iran. The actions are strictly an act of retaliation for what is considered restoring deterrence.

...If the reports are to be believed, Soleimani grew more reckless and rash and started to believe in his invincibility. He even told his followers that Americans wouldn’t dare touch him. He was apparently also planning more attacks, and he masterminded the recent demonstrations in front of the U.S. embassy.

...However, as international relations follow Newton’s Third Law of reaction to every action, Soleimani’s death has managed to at least temporarily unite the Iranians. Decapitation strikes against a top official usually does not empower moderates, but unite a country, and suppress moderate voices. Historically it is the extremists who then claim that they had been right all along, in what is known as a “rally round the flag” effect.

...overall, autocratic regimes are restrained, as their primary motivation is the survival of their crony system. From Deng’s China, to the late-stage Soviet Union, to countless other middling powers in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the historical evidence on that is overwhelming.

...The key question here is, as always, how strong Iran is domestically. Is Iran domestically enough strong to absorb this, wait, and carry on, or is it extremely fragile, and its regime stability depends on retaliation and diversionary escalation? Do we even know and have reliable data on that?

The fear is not that Iran will start a hot war. The fear is that Iran will continue a proxy war. Or worse, the regime is too fragile and collapses, resulting in our perpetual involvement in a region with peripheral interest to our nation, as other great powers and peer rivals enjoy us getting bogged down once again in the quicksand.

...Personnel is policy, and who advises the president is the most important question now.

Read more here.